Pengaruh Kompensasi Manajemen, Kecurangan Laporan Keuangan Dan Tata Kelola Perusahaan Terhadap Kualitas Laba
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54964/liabilitas.v1i2.11Keywords:
Kompensasi manajemen, kecurangan laporan keuangan, tata kelola perusahaan, kualitas labaAbstract
Laba memainkan peran penting dalam laporan keuangan jika di dalamnya mengandung informasi tentang fenomena utama perusahaan tersampaikan kepada para pengguna dengan baik. Manfaat potensial informasi adalah hal penting dimana manfaat ditentukan oleh kualitas informasi. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendapatkan bukti empiris mengenai faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi kualitas laba, yaitu kompensasi manajemen, kecurangan laporan keuangan dan tata kelola perusahaan. Dalam penelitian ini, tata kelola perusahaan diproksi dengan efektifitas komite audit.
Sampel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di BEI pada periode 2010 sampai 2011 dengan jumlah sampel sebanyak 110. Metode analisis yang digunakan adalah regresi linear berganda.
Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa kompensasi manajemen berpengaruh negatif terhadap kualitas laba dan efektifitas komite audit berpengaruh positif terhadap kualitas laba. Sedangkan, hipotesis kecurangan laporan keuangan berpengaruh negatif terhadap kualitas laba ditolak.
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